REWARDS.

business it represents: Byrne v.
Stewart, 124 Pa. 45o . And is to be
calculated by estimating every advantage secured by succeeding to
the business, without reference to
the exclusion of any person from

engaging in the same business:
Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio,
St. 22. In one case, it was assessed
at one year's average net profits:
Mellersh v. Keen, 28 Beav. 453.
R. D. S.
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Reward-How Earned-Validityof Contract- Who liable.
I. A reward offered for the prosecution and conviction of persons who
violate any of the statutes against bribery or corruption at elections, is
earned by procuring the prosecution, followed by a plea of not guilty, of
a tax collector who issued false tax receipts. The fact that sentence was
suspended is not material, the word conviction being construed in its
popular and not its technical sense.
2. It is not against public policy to offer a reward for the conviction of
-offenses thereafter committed against election laws, nor is such a contract
without consideration, if acted on in good faith. The bona fides of such
a transaction, where the evidence is conflicting as to whether or not the
plaintiff induced the commission of the crime in order to procure the
reward, is for the jury.
3. When defendant, as chairman of a state political committee, signed
and published an offer of reward for the conviction of persons who should
violate the election laws, and subsequently, at a public meeting, declared
that he had $1ooo to pay for such a conviction, the question as to his
personal liability on the offer is for the jury.
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I. How the Contractis Forned.A reward, which is a promise, made
-usually by public advertisement,
either to a particular person or persons, or to any or all persons, to
pay a certain sum of money to one
who will perform certain services

enumerated in the offer, belongs to
the class of conditional contracts,
and no liability arises upon it until
it is made complete by acceptance
and performance of its conditions.
No special form is necessary to
the validity of such a contract. In

IReported in 15i Pa. St. 2o0; 31 W. N. C. 237; 25 Atl. Rep. 86.
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fact, rewards are usually offered by
public advertisement, as said above,
either by means of newspapers or
of handbills; but as such an offer
seems to create a contract at common law, and not one within the
Statute of Frauds, there would seem
to be no reason why it may not
be equally valid if merely a verbal
offer: Byrnes v. Williams, i Moore,
P. C. (U. S.) 154; Reifv. Paige, 55
Wis. 496; S. C.. 42 Am. Rep. 731.
When once communicated to the
public, the contract is complete
upon the compliance of any one
with its terms, and the offeror is
liable upon it: Brigg's Case, 15 Ct.
of Cl. 48; McLeod z. Meade, 77 Cal.
87; S. C- r9 Pac. Rep. 189; Pierson v. Morch, 8.2 N. Y. 502. It is
not necessary that the one who accepts and acts upon the offer should
give the offeror notice of his intention so to do: Harson v. Pike, I6
Ind. i4o; Reif v. Paige, 55 Wis.
496; S. C. 42 Am. Rep. 731.
The offeror need not be personally interested in the matter concerning which the reward is offered:
Furman v. Parke, 21 N. J. L. 31o.
An agent may offer a reasonable reward for the recovery of property
belonging to his principal; aud if
he offer an excessive one, the person who receives the property may
recover a reasonable sum as compensation: Gibb's Case, 14 Ct. of
Cl. 544. The burgesses of a borough may lawfully offer a reward
for the detection and punishment
of a criminal, as it is really the state
acting through them: Borough of
York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. St. 39r.
But the officers of a town (in New
England) cannot do so: Gale v.
Berwick, 51 Me. 174; Abel v. Pembroke, 61 N. H. 357. Nor of a
county in Oregon: Mountain v.
Multnomah Co., 16 Oreg. 279; S.

C. i8 Pac. Rep. 464. But an offer
of a reward, made by the mayor,.
will bind the town, if ratified by
the city council, which represents
the whole body of the inhabitants:
Crawsbaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray
(Mass.), 374:
These cases depend on local laws,
however, and it is reasonably certain that in most of the United
States, municipal corporations can
offer rewards for the arrest and
punishment of criminals, and for
other matters of public concern.
The offeror may prescribe any
conditions he pleases': Arms v.
Conner, 43 Ark. 337. And may
withdraw his offer at any time before performance: Ryer v. Stockwell, 14 Cal. 134; Biggers v. Owen,
79 Ga. 658; S. C. 5 S. R. Rep. 193;
Shuey v. U. S., 2 Otto (92 U. S.)
73. But if the offer stands aud its
declared conditions are performed,
it makes no difference that the results do not meet the private expectations of the offeror. His secret
motives form no part of the contract: Kashing v. Morris, 71 Tex.
584; S. C. 9 S. W. Rep. 739The offer need not in all cases be
actually communicated to the public. It would seem to be sufficient
if it be published where the public
might have access to it. Thus,
when the governor officially signed
a proclamation offering a reward
for the appiehension and delivery
to the proper jailer of a fugitive
from justice, and it was entered on
the executive journal, the offer was.
held complete without further publication: Auditor v. Ballard, 9 Bush.
(Ky.) 272; S. C. i5 Am. Rep. 728.
. Such an offer, when acted upon,
is not a nudzm factum. The perfornance of its conditions is a good
consideration - Ryer v. Stockwell,
14 Cal. 134; Janvrin v. Exeter, 48
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N. H. 83; Furman v. Parke, 21 N.
J. L. 3o.
It is a mooted question whether
or not it is essential that the performance of the services should be
made with a knowledge of the offer and with a view to obtaining
the reward. Some cases have held
that these are essential, as without
them there can be no mutuality
between the parties: Hewitt v.
Anderson, 56 Cal. 476; S. C. 38
Am. Rep. 65 ; Chic. & Alton R. R.
v. Sebring, 16111. App. 181; Leev.
Trustees, 7 Dana (Ky.) 28, (but
see Auditor v. Ballard, infra);
Furman v. Parke, 21 N. J. L. 310;
Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248;
Howland v. Lounds, 5, N. Y. 604;
S. C. io Am. Rep. 654. But several well-considered cases hold that
neither knowledge nor intention is
-essential; and that it is sufficient,
if the services be in fact performed: Williams v. Carwardine,
4B.& Ad. 621; S. C. 5C. &P.
566 ; Gibbons v. Proctor, 64 L. T.
N. S. 59 4; S. C. 7T.L.R. 462; 55
J. P. 616; Eagle v. Smith, 4 Houst.
(Del.) 293; Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199. "Would the
benefit to the State be diminished
by a discovery of the fact that appellee, instead of acting from mercenary motives, had been actuated
solely by a desire to prevent the
escape of a fugitive and to bring a
felon to trial?" : Auditor v. Ballard, 9 Bush. (Ky.) 572; S. C. 15
Am. Rep. 728. On strict legal
principles, perhaps, the former
opinion is the better; but the man,
who arrests a criminal, or recovers
stolen property, has certainly some
equity to the reward offered, which
courts that proceed on equitable
principles ought to respect.
The offer of a reward is not of
unlimited duration. It is good only
15

for a reasonable time. In Loring
v. Boston, 7 Mete. (Mass.) 409, it
was held to have expired after the
lapse of three years and eight
months; but in Re Kelly, 39 Conn.
159, it was held that the offer was
not barred by the lapse of nearly
three years, but held good until the
statute of limitations had run
against the crime.
It is not against public policy to
offer a reward for the detection and
conviction of future offenses: Wilmoth v. Hensel (the principal
case), 151 Pa. St. 200; S. C. 31 W.
N. C. 237; 25 AUt. Rep. 86.
II. Performance of Conditions.
-Before one is entitled to a reward, he must show that he has
fully complied with the conditions
of the offer: Arms v. Conner, 43
Ark. 337; Nall v. Proctor, 3 Metc.
(Ky.) 447 ; Goldsborough v. Cradie,
28 MId. 477; Com. v. Edwards, io
Phila. (Pa.) 215; Shuey v. U. S.,
2 Otto (92 U. S.) 73; Jones v.
Phoenix Bank, 8 N. Y. 228. A reward for information that will lead
to the arrest and conviction of a
criminal is not earned until the
trial and conviction are brought
about: Ryer v. Stockwell, 14 Cal.
134. When an arrest is the consequence of the criminal's surrendering himself to justice, the one who
arrests him on such surrender cannot claim a reward offered for information leading to his conviction:
Bent v. Union Bank, 4 C. P. D. i.
So, when a reward was offered for
the arrest of a fugitive and his delivery to a certain jail, and A. arrested him and delivered him to a
magistrate, by whom he was put in
the custody of a constable, where
he remained until he was tried and
acquitted, it was held that A. had
not earned the reward: Clanton v.
Young, i r Rich. (S. C. L.) 546. A
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mere imparting of information or
suspicion will not earn a reward offered for an arrest and conviction:
Burke v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 50
Cal., 218. Information gained by
one not entitled to claim a reward
(a public officer), and by him communicated to another, on whose
advice the criminal confessed to
him and the officer together, and a
conviction was had on that confession, was held -not to entitle such
person to the reward: Dunham v.
Stockbridge, 133 Mass. 233. Information, which merely tends to
create suspicion, without enough to
justify the arrest of the suspect,
will not entitle to a reward offered
for the arrest of the offender:
Austin v. Supervisors, 24 Wis. 279.
A fortiori the claimant cannot
recover, if the necessary services,
or a part of them, were not, in
fact, performed by him: Sanderson v. Lane, 43 Mo. App. 158;
County of Juniata v. McDonald,
122 Pa. St. 11 5 ; S. C. 15 Atl. Rep.
696; Adair v. Cooper, 25 Tex. 548,
or were performed witfhout any intention of claiming the reward:
Fallich v. Barber, i M. &S. io8. A
reward for information that,%Vill lead
to arrest and conviction, does not
intend information given in casual
conversation, but such as is given
with a view to its being acted on,
either to the person offering the
reward, or his agent, or to an officer with authority to arrest; not to
a third person with no duty or interest in the premises: Lockhart
v. Barnard, i4 M. & W. 674. When
a "liberal reward" was offered for
information leading to the arrest of
a fugitive from justice and a specific sum for his arrest, the "liberal
reward" was held due upon the
giving of the information required,
but not the specific sum, unless the

arrest was in fact made by the
claimant or his agents: Shuey v.
U. S., 2 Otto (92 U. S.) 73The services must be performed.
in good faith; an unauthorized
arrest of a defendant out on bail
will not earn a reward: Marking
v. Needy, 8 Bush. (Ky.) 22. Areward is not earned by an arrest of
runaways, if the claimant knew
they were returning: Goldsborough v. Cradie, 28 Md. 477. "One
who assists in the escape of a prisoner, and withholds that fact cannot recover a reward for information leading to his recapture: Hassan v. Doe, 38 Me. 45. So, one
who actually aids in concealing
and maintaining a fugitive, and
finally surrenders him on an express agreement with him that he
should be given a portion of the
sum received as a reward, is not
entitled to it: Bledsoe v. Jackson,
4 Sneed. (Tenn.) 429. And an informer cannot recover a reward for
recovery of stolen goods, if he had
them in his possession, knowing
them to be stolen, or was, in any
way, connected with the felony:
Jenkins v. Kelren, 12 Gray (Mass.)
330. But it would seem that a receiver can recover a reward for information leading to the arrest of
the thieves: Tarner v. Walker, 6
B.& S. 871;S.'C. I L.R.Q.B.
641; Aff., 2 L. R. P. B. 241 ; 8 B.
& S. 314. Where the evidence is conflicting as to whether or not
the plaintiff procured the commission of the crime with a view to
obtaining the reward, the question
of his good faith is for the jury:
Wilmoth v. Hensel (the principal
case), i5r Pa. St 200 ;S. C. 31 W. N.
C. 237 ; 25 Atl. Rep. 86.
According to one case, a reward
offered for the arrest of two persons
is not recoverable pro-tanto on the
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arrest of one: Blain v. Pac. Exp.
Co. (Tex.), 6 S. W. Rep. 679. But
this rule would hardly extend to
the case of lost or stolen property,
in view of the cogent reasoning in
Symmes v. Frazier, 6 Mass. 344,
where a reward had been offered
for the recovery of a parcel of lost
bankbills, and the court held the
finder of part entitled to afiro tanto
reward. "Any other consideration
would be extremely mischievous in
its effects, and would in most cases
tend to convert an honest finder of
lost or stolen property into a fraudulent concealer of it. For when an
honest man in low circumstances,
encouraged by an advertisement
like that in the present case, and
having bestowed his time and labor
in searching for and restoring lost
property, shall find that, by accident or previous fraud, part of the
property has disappeared, and that
by law his diligence and fidelity are
to pass wholly without reward, the
temptation to convert the whole to
his own use might be too strong to
resist; for in most cases a detection
would be difficult, if not impossible.
It is, therefore for the interest of
the loser, and certainly tends to
secure the integrity of the finder,
that whenever any proportion of
the property is found and actually
restored, undercircumstances which
leave no doubt of the faithfulness
and integrity of the finder, this
latter should have such part of the
reward which may have been offered as will be proportionate to the
property so restored."
But a reward offered for the return of "lost" property cannot be
recovered if it was not in fact lost
in the legal sense of the word. If
one dealing with a bank accidentally leaves his pocketbook on a
desk in the banking-room, and

publishes an advertisement describing it as lost and promising a reward for its return, another who,
while dealing at the bank, discovers
and takes it is not entitled to the
reward, as it was never lost in the
eye of the law, being in the custody
of the bank: Kincaid v. Raton, 9S
Mass. 139.
It is not necessary, in order to
earn a reward, that .its conditions
be literally complied with; a substantial compliance is all that is
required. If a criminal, arrested
on suspicion, afterwards confesses,
such confession wlll entitle the one
who secured it to a reward offered
for procuring information: Smith
v. Mloore, i C. B. 438. When a reward was offered for the delivery of
an escaped prisoner at a certain
place, and two persons arrested him
and were taking him thither, when
they were intercepted, and the prisoner demanded of them by the
sheriff of the county in which they
then were, to whom they surrendered him, giving notice that they
claimed the reward, it was held
that they had earned it: Stone vDysert, 20 Kans. 123. So, where
conviction is a condition of the reward, the latter is earned, though
the conviction is prevented by the
dismissal of the indictment at the
instance and request of an attorney
employed by the offeror to prosecute: R. R. v. Goodnight, io Bush.
(KY.) 552; S. C. i9 Am. Rep. 8o;
though an order is procured arresting judgment, or discharging the
prisoner, after a verdict of guilty:
Buckley v. Schwartz, 83 Wis. 304;
S. C. 53 N. IV. Rep. 511; or
though the verdict of guilty is
followed by a suspension of judgment: William's Case, 12 Ct.
of Cl. 192: Wilmoth v. Hensel
(the principal case), r5i Pa. St.
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S. C. 31 W. N. C. 237; 25
Atl. Rep. 86.
A reward is earned when the
guilty person is pointed out, though
he had an accomplice: Gilkey v.
Bailey, 2 Harr. (Del.) 359; when
the criminal is convicted, though
the conviction could not have been
had without his own confession:
Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray
(Mass.) 374; and a reward for
"detection" is earned by giving
information that leads thereto:
Brennan v. Hoff, I Hilt. (N. Y.)
151 ; Besse v. Dyer. 9 Allen (Mass.)
151.
The services need not be performed in person; they may be
performed through an agent: Co.
-of Montgomery'v. Robinson, 85 111.
174; Pruitt v. Miller, 3 Ind. 16;
and when information is required,
it need not be given to the offeror.
It is sufficient if it be given to one
with authority to receive and act on
it: Lancasterv. Walsh, 4M &W. I6.
III. Who is Entitledto Reward.
-This depends, in the first instance, on the wording of the offer.
As the offeror may prescribe what
terms he pleases, he may restrict
his offer to a particular class of
persons, or to a particular person.
But even in such a case it has been
held that one not within the terms
of the offer may become entitled to
the -reward, if his services are accepted and made use of by the
offeror: Bank v. Hart, 55 Ill. 62.
When the offer is general, however, anyone (with one exception,
to be noted hereafter) may perform
the services required, and so become
entitled to the reward: Cummings
v. Gann, 52 Pa. St. 484. If more
than one do so, the first only is
entitled to it: Lancaster v. Walsh,
4 M. & W. 16. See Thatcher v.
Rugland, 3 C. B. 254. One who
200;

assists another in performing the
services cannot recover a proportionate part of the reward without
an express promise to share it with
him: Stroud v. Garrison, 24 Ark.
53. But several persons may make
an agreement to apportion a reward,
when recovered, between them, and
in such a case one who receives the
whole reward will be liable to each of
the others for his proportion, in an
action for money had and received:
Dawson v. Gurley, 22 Ark. 381.
The owner of a stolen horse, who
pursues and captures the thief, is
entitled to the statutory reward
given by Acts Penna., Mch. 15,
1821 (P. L. 9o) : Co. of Butler v.
Leibold, 107 Pa. 407. An employd
of a railroad company may earn a
general reward offered by it: Chic.
& Alton R. R. Co. v. Sebring, 16
11. App. 18i; and an infant who
performs the required services niay
maintain an action to recover the
reward on attaining his majority:
Morris v. Kasling (Tex.), 15 S.W.
Rep. 226.
The exception to the rule that
anyone who performs the services
required may.earn a general reward
is, that a public officer may not do
so when the services lie in the line
of his duty. Any offer to compensate him for doing that duty is
against public policy, and void;
and his performance of the services
creates no .contract between him
and the offeror: R. R. v. Grafton,
St Ark. 504; S. C. ii S. W. Rep.
702; Re Russell, 51 Conn. 577 ; S.
C. 50 Am. Rep. 55; Means v. Hendershott, 24 Iowa 79. This rule has
been applied to constables: Hayden v. Souger, 56 Ind. 42; S. C. 26
Am. Rep. i ; lxp. Gore, 57 Miss.
251 ; Smith v. Whilldin, io Pa. St.
39; Gilmore v. Lewis; 12 Ohio, 281;
policemen: Kick v. Merry, 23 Mo.
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72; Thornton v. 'Mo. Pac. Rv., 42
Mo. App. 58; sheriffs: Rea z.
Smith, 2 Handy (Ohio), 193; Stamper v. Temple, b Humph. (Tenn.),
113; deputy sheriffs: Warner v.
Grace, 14 Miun. 487; chiefs of police: Day v. Ins. Co., 6Minun. 4o8;
watchmen: Pool.v. Boston, 5 Cush.
(Mass.) 220; customs officers: Davis v. Burns, 5 Allen, (Mass.) 352;
and overseers of the poor: Ring v.
Devlin (Wis.), 32 N. IV. Rep. 121.
Even a private person, who applies
for and receives from a sheriff a
warrant and special depiitation to
arrest a fugitive from justice, becomes a deputy thereby, and cannot recover a reward for the arrest:
Malpass v. Caldwell, 70 N. C. 13o.
But if the warrant was illegal, or
otherwise conferred on him no
authority to make the arrest, he
can still claim the reward: Hayden
v. Souger, 56 Ind..42 ; S. C. 26 Am.
Rep. I.
This exception does not apply,
however, where the services are
outside of the officer's line of duty:
England v,. Davidson, ii Ad. &
El. 856. As where a fugitive from
one State is arrested without process by an officer of another State :
Morrell v. Quarles, 35 Ala. 544. Or
even by an officer of another
county: Davis v. Munson, 43 Vt.
676; S. C. 5 Am. Rep. 315. A
constable temporarily suspended
does not act in the line of his duty
in securing evidence to convict a
criminal: Smith v. Moore, I C. B.
438. It is no part of the duty of a
municipal officer to leave his city
and county, and prosecute an offender in another count- : Bronneberg v. Coburn, 1io Ind. 169; S.
C. i iN. E. Rep. 29.
It is not the
duty of an officer to make an arrest without warrant for an offence
not committed in his view, and
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without legal complaint made
against the party arrested: Kasliug z'. Morris, 7 r Tex. 584; S. C.
9 S. W. Rep. 739; Russell z.
Stewart, 44 Vt. 170. So, when a
sheriff of a county in New York
pursued a fugitive to Illinois, and
there arrested him under a requisition, it was held that he did not receive process in Illinois as sheriff,.
that he made the arrest as a private
citizen, that the fact that he was
sheriff, or that the requisition described him as such, added nothing
to his authority, and that he was
entitled to the reward : Gregg v.
Plerce, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 387. But
see Malpass v. Caldwell, 7o N. C.
130.
And, similarly, a fireman
can recover a reward for rescuing
a-body from a burning building, as
it is no part of his duty to risk his
life in the service: Reif z,. Paige,
55X is- 496; S. C. 42 Am. Rep.
731.
A reward for the arrest of "any
one who has killed another, and is
fleeing or attempting to flee before
arrest" is earned by a private person, who arrests a criminal whohas escaped from arrest by another
private person : Wilson v. 'Wallace,
64 Miss. 13; S. C. 8 So. Rep. 128;
but not when he has escaped from
an officer: Candler z. Itawamba
Co., 62 Miss. 194.
IV. Liability on Offer.-There is
sometimes a doubt as to whether
the offer of a reward creates a personal liability. If offered by a private individual, acting for himself,
it undoubtedly does so; but where
it is offered by a public officer, or
by a person acting as the agent of
another, it depends wholly upon
the authority of the offeror to bind
his principal by such an offer. An
agent may bind his principal by
offering a reward for the recovery
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of property: Gibb's Case, 14 Ct. of
C1. 544. And a railroad superintendent, without express authority,
may bind the company by the offer of a reward for the arrest of
persons offending against its property rights: Cent. R. R. & Bkg.
Co. v. Cheatham, 85 Ala. 292 ; S. C.
.4 So. Rep. 828. But whether an offer of a reward by the chairman of
a political committee binds him
personally is a question for the
jury: Wilmoth v. Hensel (the principal case), 151 Pa. St. 200; S. C.
31 W. N. C. 237 ; 25 Ati. Rep. 86.
Public officers, however, must
-show clear authority to bind the
municipality; and if they do not,
they will be personally liable, although they make the offer under
their official designation: Prentiss
v. Farnham, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 519;
Freeman v. Boston, 5 Metc. (Mass.)
56; Brown v. Bradlee, 156 Mass.
28; Borough of York v. Forscht,
23 Pa. St. 391; Lee v. Trustee, 7
Dana (Ky.), 28.
In general an offer of a reward is
to be construed as the public would
understand it, and not with strict
technicality: Fargo v. Arthur, 43
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 193 ; Wilmoth v.
Hensel (the principal case), 151 Pa.
St. 200; S. C. 3 1 W. N. C. 23 7 ; 25
Atl. Rep. 86. Whether it applies
to past offences, or future, or both,
is to be gathered from the wording
of the particular offer: Cent. R. R.
& Bkg. Co. v. Cheatham, 85 Ala.
292 ; S. C. 4 So. Rep. 828 ; Cornelson v. Ins. Co., 7 La. An. 345;
Salbadore v. Ins. Co., 22 La. An.
338; Freeman v. Boston, 5 Metc.
(Mass.) 56; Loring v. Boston, 7
Metc. (Mass.) 4o9; Re Kelly, 39
Conn. 159.
Although the finder of lost property has no claim to a reward, if
none has been offered: Watts v.

Ward, I Oreg. 86; Wentworth v.
Day, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 352; Nicholson v. Chapman, 2 H. B1. 254 ;
only to be reimbursed his necessary expenses in keeping it:
Amory v. Flynn, iojohng. (N. Y.)
1O2 ; yet if a reward has been offered, the finder has a lien on the
property to the amount of the reward, and can retain it until the
reward is paid : Wentworth v. Day,
3 Mete. (Mass.) 352; Cummings v.
Gann, 52 Pa. St. 484.
But no lien
is implied when the offer is merely
of a "liberal reward: " Wilson v.
'Guyton, 8 Gill. (Md.) 13. If the
finder has sued for the reward and
recovered judgment, he can still
retain the property until the judgment is paid, and the owner cannot replevy it: Everman v. Hyman, 3 Ind. App. 459.
When two persons claim a reward, it is held in England that it
is not a proper case for an interpleader: Collis v. Lee, i Hodges,
204 ; but in New York, that it is :
-Fargo v. Arthur, 43 How. Pr. (N.
Y.) 193.
When a reward has been earned
by one person, but paid to another
through fraud or mistake, an action
will lie to recover it from the
wrongful receiver: Stephens v.
Brooks, 2 Bush. (Ky.) 137, but
not assumpsit for-money had and
received; for there is no privity
between the&: Sergeant v. Stryker,
16 N. J. L. 464.
When an offer of a reward for
arrest or information is in the disjunctive, and one person arrests and
another gives the information required, the offeror must pay each a
sum equal to the reward offered:
Per Ld. Kenyon, in Ernst's Case, 3
Went. Plead. 30.
When the claimant did not know
at the time that a reward had been
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offered, any sum accepted by him
in return for the services performed
-will be considered as in satisfaction
thereof: Marvin v. Treat, 37 Conn.
96.
V. Praclice.-A reward need not
be declared on specially, but may
be recovered on a general iudebitalus assumsit: Bank v. Hart, 55 Ill.
62. The declaration must show that
the plaintiff has performed the conditions of the offer: Codding v.
Mansfield, 7 Gray (Mass.), 272. To
recover on a reward for arrest and
conviction, the plaintiff must allege
that he was instrumental in procuring the conviction, not merely that
the criminal was convicted: Furman v. Parke, 21 N. J. L. 3io;

Morris v. Kasling (Tex.), 15 S. W.
Rep. 26. The record of conviction
is evidence that the claimant has
earned the reward: Brown v. Bradlee, 156 Mass. 28; overruling on
this point Mead v. Boston, 3 Cush.
(Mass.) 4o4. The Statute of Limitation does not begin to run against
a claim for a reward until it has
been earned by full performance:
Ryer v. Stockwell, I4 Cal. 134.
[NOTE.-- People are very ready to offer
rewards for the discovery of offenders
whilst smarting under the loss or injury
they have sustained, but are slow indeed
to pay them when the claimants present
themselves:" C. J.Tindal, in Smith v.
Moore, i C.B. 438.]
R. D. S.

